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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Because many immigrants to the United States, especially Mexicans and Central Americans, are young men who 
arrive with very low levels of formal education, popular ste-
reotypes tend to associate them with higher rates of crime 
and incarceration. The fact that many of these immigrants 
enter the country through unauthorized channels or overstay 
their visas often is framed as an assault against the “rule of 
law,” thereby reinforcing the impression that immigration 
and criminality are linked. This association has fl ourished 
in a post-9/11 climate of fear and ignorance where terrorism 
and undocumented immigration often are mentioned in the 
same breath.
But anecdotal impression cannot substitute for sci-
entifi c evidence. In fact, data from the census and other 
sources show that for every ethnic group without excep-
tion, incarceration rates among young men are lowest for 
immigrants, even those who are the least educated. This 
holds true especially for the Mexicans, Salvadorans, and 
Guatemalans who make up the bulk of the undocumented 
population. What is more, these patterns have been ob-
served consistently over the last three decennial censuses, a 
period that spans the current era of mass immigration, and 
recall similar national-level fi ndings reported by three ma-
jor government commissions during the fi rst three decades 
of the 20th century. The problem of crime in the United States 
is not “caused” or even aggravated by immigrants, regardless 
of their legal status. But the misperception that the opposite is 
true persists among policymakers, the media, and the general 
public, thereby undermining the development of reasoned 
public responses to both crime and immigration.
Among the fi ndings in this report:
Crime Rates Have Declined as Immigration Has Increased
Even as the undocumented population has doubled to 
12 million since 1994, the violent crime rate in the United 
States has declined 34.2 percent and the property crime rate 
has fallen 26.4 percent.
Cities with large immigrant populations such as Los An-
geles, New York, Chicago, and Miami also have experienced 
declining crime rates during this period.
Immigrants Have Lower Incarceration Rates than Natives
Among men age 18-39 (who comprise the vast majority 
of the prison population), the 3.5 percent incarceration rate 
of the native-born in 2000 was 5 times higher than the 0.7 
percent incarceration rate of the foreign-born.
The foreign-born incarceration rate in 2000 was nearly 
two-and-a-half times less than the 1.7 percent rate for native-
born non-Hispanic white men and almost 17 times less than 
the 11.6 percent rate for native-born black men.
Native-born Hispanic men were nearly 7 times more 
likely to be in prison than foreign-born Hispanic men in 
2000, while the incarceration rate of native-born non-
Hispanic white men was almost 3 times higher than that of 
foreign-born white men.
Foreign-born Mexicans had an incarceration rate of only 
0.7 percent in 2000—more than 8 times lower than the 
5.9 percent rate of native-born males of Mexican descent. 
Foreign-born Salvadoran and Guatemalan men had an in-
carceration rate of 0.5 percent, compared to 3.0 percent of 
native-born males of Salvadoran and Guatemalan descent.
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Foreign-born Chinese/Taiwanese men had an extremely 
low incarceration rate of 0.2 percent in 2000, which was three-
and-a-half times lower than the 0.7 percent incarceration rate 
of native-born men of Chinese/Taiwanese descent.
The incarceration rate of foreign-born Laotian and 
Cambodian men (0.9 percent) was the highest among Asian 
immigrant groups in 2000, but was more than 8 times lower 
than that of native-born men of Laotian and Cambodian 
descent (7.3 percent).
With the exception of Laotians and Cambodians, for-
eign-born men from Asian countries had lower incarceration 
rates than those from Latin American countries, as did their 
native-born counterparts. This is not surprising given that 
immigrants from India, Taiwan, China, South Korea, and the 
Philippines are among the most educated groups in the United 
States, while immigrants from Cambodia, Laos, Mexico, and 
Central American countries are among the least educated.
Immigrants Have Lower Incarceration Rates than Natives 
among High-School Dropouts
For all ethnic groups, the risk of imprisonment was high-
est for men who were high-school dropouts. But among the 
foreign-born, the incarceration gap by education was much 
narrower than for the native-born.
The highest incarceration rate among U.S.-born men 
who had not fi nished high school was seen among non-
Hispanic blacks, 22.3 percent of whom were imprisoned in 
2000—more than triple the 7.1 percent incarceration rate 
among foreign-born black high-school dropouts.
The incarceration rate of native-born Hispanic men with-
out a high-school diploma in 2000 (12.4 percent) was more 
than 11 times higher than the 1.1 percent rate of foreign-born 
Hispanic high-school dropouts.
Foreign-born Mexicans without a high-school diploma 
had an incarceration rate of 0.7 percent in 2000—more than 
14 times less than the 10.1 percent of native-born male high-
school dropouts of Mexican descent behind bars.
Only 0.6 percent of foreign-born Salvadoran and Guate-
malan high-school dropouts in 2000 were in prison, which 
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was nearly 8 times lower than the 4.7 percent incarceration 
rate among native-born men of Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
descent who lacked high-school diplomas.
The 0.9 percent incarceration rate of foreign-born Viet-
namese high-school dropouts in 2000 was vastly lower than 
the 16.2 percent rate of native-born high-school dropouts of 
Vietnamese descent. The incarceration rate of native-born 
high-school dropouts of Indian descent (6.7 percent) was far 
greater than the 0.3 percent rate among foreign-born Indian 
high-school dropouts.
The Paradox of Assimilation
The higher rate of imprisonment for native-born men 
than foreign-born men highlights a darker side to assimila-
tion than is commonly recognized.
The process of assimilation often involves the acquisition 
by immigrants and their descendants of English-language 
profi ciency, higher levels of education, valuable new job skills, 
and other attributes that ease their entry into U.S. society and 
improve their chances of success in the U.S. economy.
However, other aspects of assimilation are not as posi-
tive. For instance, immigrants, especially those from Latin 
America, have lower rates of adult and infant mortality and 
give birth to fewer underweight babies than natives despite 
higher poverty rates and greater barriers to health care. But 
their health status—and that of their children—worsens the 
longer they live in the United States and with increasing 
acculturation.
The children and grandchildren of many immigrants—as 
well as many immigrants themselves the longer they live in 
the United States—become subject to economic and social 
forces, such as higher rates of family disintegration and drug 
and alcohol addiction, that increase the likelihood of criminal 
behavior among other natives.
The risk of incarceration is higher not only for the chil-
dren of immigrants, but for immigrants themselves the longer 
they have resided in the United States. However, even im-
migrants who had resided in the United States for 16+ years 
were far less likely to be incarcerated than their native-born 
counterparts.
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3PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRANTS 
AND CRIME
Myths and stereotypes about immigrants and crime of-ten provide the underpinnings for public policies and 
practices.1 These stereotypes are propagated through movies 
and television series like The Untouchables, The Godfather, 
Scarface, Miami Vice, and The Sopranos—all of which project 
an enduring image of immigrant communities permeated 
by criminal elements. Moreover, the media long have been 
replete with stories of violent crimes committed by the Italian 
mafi a, Cuban marielitos, Colombian cocaine cartels, Japanese 
yakuza, Chinese triads, and Central American gangs such as 
the Salvadoran Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). Similar views 
greeted Irish, Jewish, Polish, and other immigrants in the 
19th and early 20th centuries.
The extent to which stereotypes such as these have per-
meated U.S. society is apparent in the results of the National 
Opinion Research Center’s 2000 General Social Survey, which 
interviewed a nationally representative sample of adults to 
measure attitudes toward and perceptions of immigration in 
a “multi-ethnic United States.” Asked whether “more immi-
grants cause higher crime rates,” 25 percent said “very likely” 
and another 48 percent “somewhat likely.” In other words, 
about three-fourths (73 percent) of Americans believed that 
immigration is causally related to more crime. That was a 
much higher proportion than the 60 percent who believed 
that “more immigrants were [somewhat or very] likely to 
cause Americans to lose jobs,” or the 56 percent who thought 
that “more immigrants were [somewhat or very] likely to 
make it harder to keep the country united.”2
Periods of increased immigration have historically been 
accompanied by nativist alarms, perceptions of threat, and 
pervasive stereotypes of newcomers, particularly during eco-
nomic downturns or national crises (such as the 2000-2002 
economic recession and the “war on terror” of the post-9/11 
era), and when immigrants have arrived en masse and differed 
substantially from the native-born in religion, language, 
physical appearance, and world region of origin.3 The present 
period is no exception. California’s Proposition 187, which 
was passed with 59 percent of the statewide vote in 1994 (but 
challenged as unconstitutional and overturned by a federal 
court), asserted in its opening lines that “the people of Cali-
fornia…have suffered and are suffering economic hardship 
[and] personal injury and damage caused by the criminal 
conduct of illegal aliens in this state.”4
Similarly, the “Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance” 
passed in 2006 by the city council of Hazleton, Pennsylva-
nia—the fi rst of a number of such ordinances passed by local 
councils in 2006—declares in part that “illegal immigration 
leads to higher crime rates” and seeks accordingly to secure for 
the city’s legal residents and citizens “the right to live in peace 
free of the threat of crime” and to protect them from “crime 
committed by illegal aliens.”5 Such attitudes fi nd support at 
the highest levels of political leadership. For instance, in his 
May 15, 2006, address to the nation on immigration reform, 
President George W. Bush asserted that: “Illegal immigration 
puts pressure on public schools and hospitals, it strains state 
and local budgets, and brings crime to our communities.”6
The misperception that the foreign-born, especially illegal 
immigrants, are responsible for higher crime rates is deeply 
rooted in American public opinion and is sustained by media 
anecdote and popular myth. But this perception is not sup-
ported empirically. In fact, it is refuted by the preponderance 
of scientifi c evidence. Both contemporary and historical data, 
including investigations carried out by major government 
commissions over the past century, have shown repeatedly 
and systematically that immigration actually is associated 
with lower crime rates.
A NEW ERA OF MASS IMMIGRATION
After a period of mass immigration from Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the United States expe-
rienced a relative lull in immigration from the 1920s to the 
1960s. But the past few decades have ushered in a new era of 
large-scale immigration which has accelerated since the 1980s. 
This time the fl ows have come largely from Latin America and 
Asia, not from Europe. Over the past 15 years, the number 
of immigrants—both “legal” and “illegal”7—coming to the 
United States has been the largest in its history in absolute 
terms. However, the percentage of the U.S. population that 
is foreign-born remains below the post-1850 highs recorded 
by each decennial census from 1860 through 1920, when 
immigrants comprised more than 13 percent of the popula-
tion.8 According to the most recently available national data, 
in 2006 the foreign-born population totaled about 38.1 mil-
lion, or just under 13 percent of the U.S. population.9
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Roughly 12 million immigrants, or 30 percent of all 
foreign-born persons in the country, are unauthorized. The 
number of illegal immigrants has more than doubled since 
1994. According to estimates by demographer Jeffrey Passel of 
the Pew Hispanic Center, by 2005 two-thirds (66 percent) of 
the unauthorized population had been in the country for 10 
years or less, and the largest share, 40 percent or 4.4 million 
people, had been in the country fi ve years or less. There were 
1.8 million children who were unauthorized, or 16 percent 
of the total. In addition, 3.1 million children who are U.S. 
citizens by birth were living in households in which the head 
of the family or a spouse was unauthorized. About 56 percent 
of the unauthorized population was from Mexico, and another 
22 percent from elsewhere in Latin America. The rest come 
from Asia, Europe, Canada, Africa, and elsewhere.10
Since 1993, the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border 
in four key sectors from San Diego to El Paso and the lower 
Rio Grande Valley, including a tripling of the number of 
Border Patrol agents and a quadrupling of the Border Patrol 
budget, has not deterred the fl ow of unauthorized migrants. 
Rather, as shown by several expert analyses, it has led to a 
booming industry of professional smugglers (coyotes) and re-
directed the fl ow of undocumented immigrants through more 
isolated and dangerous desert terrain, resulting in hundreds 
of deaths each year. Moreover, undocumented immigrants 
are heading to new destinations across all 50 states, includ-
ing communities like Hazleton, rather than just traditional 
destinations in California and Texas. Another unintended 
consequence of heightened border enforcement is that the 
largely temporary population of “sojourner” workers that 
predominated in the past has been transformed into a popu-
lation of permanent “settlers” who bring their families and 
stay, since the risks and costs of dangerous border crossings 
have sharply increased. For instance, in recent years coyotes 
have charged Mexican migrants about $3,000 per person to 
cross the border.11
Nonetheless, the illegal immigrant population still is 
disproportionately made up of poor young males who have 
recently arrived from Mexico—as well as from El Salvador, 
Guatemala, and a few other Latin American countries—to 
work in low-wage jobs requiring little formal education. These 
migrants are responding to the growing demand for their 
labor generated by the U.S. economy, which faces a demo-
graphic challenge to future labor-force growth as the fertility 
rate of natives declines and a growing number of native-born 
workers retire.12 As the Congressional Budget Offi ce put it 
in a 2005 report: “The baby-boom generation’s exit from the 
labor force could well foreshadow a major shift in the role of 
foreign-born workers in the labor force. Unless native fertility 
rates increase, it is likely that most of the growth in the U.S. 
labor force will come from immigration by the middle of 
the century.”13 Conventional wisdom presumes a connection 
between the characteristics of workers who fi ll less-skilled jobs 
(young, male, poor, high-school dropout, ethnic minority) 
and the likelihood of involvement with crime, all the more 
when those young male workers are illegal migrants. But if 
immigration (legal or illegal) were associated with increasing 
crime rates, the offi cial crime statistics would clearly reveal 
it. The opposite, however, is the case.
CRIME RATES HAVE DECLINED AS 
IMMIGRATION HAS INCREASED
At the same time that immigration—especially un-documented immigration—has reached and surpassed 
historic highs, crime rates in the United States have declined, 
notably in cities with large immigrant populations (including 
cities with large numbers of undocumented immigrants such 
as Los Angeles and border cities like San Diego and El Paso, 
as well as New York, Chicago, and Miami). The Uniform 
Crime Reports released each year by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) demonstrate the decline of both violent 
crime and property crime at the same time that the foreign-
born population has grown. 
From 1994 to 2005, the violent crime rate overall de-
clined 34.2 percent, reaching the lowest level ever in 2005. In 
particular, homicide rates fell 37.8 percent to levels last seen 
in the late 1960s, robbery rates dropped 40.8 percent, and 
assault rates declined 31.9 percent {Figure 1}.14 Moreover, the 
proportion of serious violent crimes committed by juveniles 
decreased during this period and the number of gun crimes 
stabilized at levels last seen in 1988.15 
The property crime rate as a whole declined 26.4 percent 
between 1994 and 2005. Specifi cally, burglary rates have 
stabilized after years of decline, theft rates reached the low-
est level ever recorded in 2005, and motor-vehicle theft rates 
leveled off after 2000 {Figure 2}.16
5Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics-Data Online, “Reported Crime in United States-Total.”
Figure 1: 
U.S. VIOLENT CRIME RATE, 1994-2005
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Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics-Data Online, “Reported Crime in United States-Total.”
Figure 2: 
U.S. PROPERTY CRIME RATE, 1994-2005
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INCARCERATION RATES HAVE INCREASED
However, alongside this new era of immigration, the U.S. incarceration rate has become the highest of any coun-
try in the world. There are more people behind bars in the 
United States than in either China or India, each of which has 
a population roughly 4 times larger than the United States.17 
Between 1980 and 2005, the number of adults incarcerated 
in federal or state prisons or in local jails in the United States 
quadrupled from just over 500,000 to 2.2 million. This 
amounts to an increase in the incarceration rate from 139 
prisoners for every 100,000 people in the country to 491 per 
100,000. Two-thirds of those are in federal or state prisons 
and one-third in local jails. The vast majority are young men 
between the age of 18 and 39.18 According to a 1998 study 
by the National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse 
at Columbia University, about 80 percent of those in prison 
either violated drug or alcohol laws, were high at the time 
they committed their crimes, stole property to buy drugs, had 
a history of drug and alcohol abuse and addiction, or some 
combination of those characteristics.19
Department of Justice statistics on incarceration are not 
broken down by nativity or generation, but the available data 
indicate that imprisonment rates vary widely by gender, eth-
nicity, and education. In 2005, about 93 percent of inmates 
in federal and state prisons were men, and there were 3,145 
non-Hispanic black male prisoners per 100,000 black males 
in the United States and 1,244 Hispanic males per 100,000, 
compared to 471 non-Hispanic white males per 100,000.20 
The majority of prison inmates are high-school dropouts.21 
Among some minorities, particularly native-born blacks, 
imprisonment has become a common and defi ning event for 
men in early adulthood. As sociologists Becky Pettit and Bruce 
Western have noted, black men born in the late 1960s were, 
by the end of the 1990s, more likely to have prison records 
than either military records or college degrees, and those who 
were high-school dropouts had a nearly 60 percent chance of 
having served time in prison.22
IMMIGRANTS’ INCARCERATION RATES 
ARE LOWER THAN NATIVES’
Conventional theories of crime and incarceration pre-dict higher rates of imprisonment for younger and less 
educated adult males from minority groups—characteristics 
which describe a much greater proportion of the foreign-
born population than of the native-born, especially illegal 
immigrants. Foreign-born Mexican men comprise a third of 
all immigrant men between the ages of 18 and 39, have the 
lowest levels of education of any ethnic group in the country, 
and account for the majority of illegal immigrants. Therefore, 
they would be expected to have the highest rates of imprison-
ment, followed by Salvadorans and Guatemalans. However, 
an analysis of data from the 2000 U.S. Census23 reveals just 
the opposite to be the case.
In 2000, 3 percent of the 45.2 million males age 18 to 39 
in the United States were in federal or state prisons or local jails 
at the time of the census. Surprisingly, at least from the vantage 
point of conventional wisdom, the incarceration rate of native-
born men in this age group (3.5 percent) was 5 times higher 
than the incarceration rate of foreign-born men (0.7 percent). 
The foreign-born rate was nearly two-and-a-half times less 
than the 1.7 percent rate for native-born non-Hispanic white 
men and almost 17 times less than the 11.6 percent rate for 
native-born non-Hispanic black men. The lower incarceration 
rate among immigrants was found in every pan-ethnic category 
without exception. For instance, native-born Hispanic men 
were nearly 7 times more likely to be in prison than foreign-
born Hispanic men, while the incarceration rate of native-born 
non-Hispanic white men was almost 3 times higher than that 
of foreign-born white men {Figure 3}.
There also was wide variation in the incarceration rates of 
native and foreign-born men within particular ethnic groups. 
Among Hispanic men, for example, foreign-born Mexicans 
had an incarceration rate of only 0.7 percent—more than 8 
times lower than the 5.9 percent rate of native-born males of 
Mexican descent. Similarly, 0.5 percent of foreign-born Salva-
doran and Guatemalan men were in prison, compared to 3.0 
percent of native-born males of Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
descent {Figure 4}.24 The incarceration rates of foreign-born 
Mexicans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans were the lowest of 
any Latin American immigrant group even though they were 
the least educated. These three nationalities are precisely the 
groups that make up the majority of illegal immigrants in 
the United States. 
A similar range of variation was found among Asian 
men. For instance, foreign-born Chinese/Taiwanese men 
had an extremely low incarceration rate of 0.2 percent, 
which was three-and-a-half times lower than the 0.7 percent 
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Figure 3: 
INCARCERATION RATES OF MALES AGE 18-39 BY PAN-ETHNIC CATEGORY & NATIVITY, 2000
Source: Source: 2000 Census, 5% PUMS.
*Although Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, not immigrants, for the purposes of this table those born on the island are classifi ed as “foreign-born” and those born on the 
mainland as “native-born.”
Figure 4: 
INCARCERATION RATES OF HISPANIC MALES AGE 18-39 BY NATIONAL ORIGIN & NATIVITY, 2000
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Source: 2000 Census, 5% PUMS.
Figure 5: 
INCARCERATION RATES OF ASIAN MALES AGE 18-39 BY NATIONAL ORIGIN & NATIVITY, 2000
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incarceration rate of native-born men of Chinese/Taiwanese 
descent. The incarceration rate of foreign-born Laotian and 
Cambodian men (0.9 percent) was the highest among Asian 
immigrant groups, but was more than 8 times lower than that 
of native-born men of Laotian and Cambodian descent (7.3 
percent). With the exception of Laotians and Cambodians, 
foreign-born men from Asian countries had lower incarcera-
tion rates than those from Latin American countries, as did 
their native-born counterparts. This is not surprising given 
that immigrants from India, Taiwan, China, South Korea, 
and the Philippines are among the most educated groups in 
the United States, while immigrants from Cambodia, Laos, 
Mexico, and Central American countries are among the least 
educated {Figure 5}.25
The 2000 Census data yielded comparable results for 
California, the state with the greatest number of both legal 
and illegal immigrants—over a quarter of the national total, 
including the largest concentrations by far of Mexicans, Sal-
vadorans, and Guatemalans—and with the greatest number 
of people in prisons and jails. Overall, native-born men age 
18 to 39 in California had higher incarceration rates than the 
rest of the United States, while the foreign-born had lower 
rates in California compared to the rest of the country. The 
incarceration rate for the native-born was more than one 
percentage point higher in California than in the rest of 
the country (4.5 percent vs. 3.4 percent). In contrast, the 
incarceration rate for the foreign-born in California was less 
than half the foreign-born rate in the rest of the country (0.4 
percent vs. 1.0 percent).
IMMIGRANTS’ INCARCERATION RATES 
ARE LOWER THAN NATIVES’ AMONG 
HIGH-SCHOOL DROPOUTS
For all ethnic groups, as expected, the risk of imprisonment was highest for men who were high-school dropouts (6.9 
percent) compared to those who were high-school graduates 
(2.0 percent). However, the greatest difference in the risk of 
incarceration by education was observed among native-born 
men, not immigrants. Among the U.S.-born, 9.8 percent of 
all male high-school dropouts were in jail or prison in 2000, 
compared to 2.2 percent among high-school graduates. But 
among the foreign-born, the incarceration gap by education 
9Source: 2000 Census, 5% PUMS.
Figure 6: 
INCARCERATION RATES OF MALE HIGH-SCHOOL DROPOUTS AGE 18-39 
BY PAN-ETHNIC CATEGORY & NATIVITY, 2000
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was much narrower. Only 1.3 percent of immigrant men who 
were high-school dropouts were incarcerated, compared to 
0.6 percent of those with at least a high-school diploma.
Nativity emerged as a stronger predictor of incarceration 
than education for all ethnic categories. Among U.S.-born 
men who had not fi nished high school, the highest incarcera-
tion rate by far was seen among non-Hispanic blacks, 22.3 
percent of whom were imprisoned at the time of the 2000 
Census—more than triple the 7.1 percent incarceration rate 
among foreign-born black high-school dropouts.26 Among 
non-Hispanic whites who had not fi nished high school, 4.8 
percent of the U.S.-born were in prison, triple the 1.6 percent 
rate among foreign-born white high-school dropouts. The 
incarceration rate of native-born Hispanic men without a 
high-school diploma (12.4 percent) was more than 11 times 
higher than the 1.1 percent rate of foreign-born Hispanic 
high-school dropouts {Figure 6}.
Again, there was considerable variation in the incarcera-
tion rates of male high-school dropouts within each ethnic 
group. Among Hispanics, 0.7 percent of foreign-born Mexi-
cans without a high-school diploma were imprisoned—more 
than 14 times less than the 10.1 percent of native-born male 
high-school dropouts of Mexican descent behind bars. Only 
0.6 percent of foreign-born Salvadoran and Guatemalan 
high-school dropouts were in prison, which was nearly 8 
times lower than the 4.7 percent incarceration rate among 
native-born men of Salvadoran and Guatemalan descent who 
lacked high-school diplomas {Figure 7}.
Even greater differences between the incarceration rates 
of native-born and foreign-born men without a high-school 
diploma were found among Asian groups. The 0.9 percent 
incarceration rate of foreign-born Vietnamese high-school 
dropouts was vastly lower than the 16.2 percent rate of 
native-born high-school dropouts of Vietnamese descent. 
Similarly, the incarceration rate of native-born high-school 
dropouts of Indian descent (6.7 percent) was far greater than 
the 0.3 percent rate among foreign-born Indian high-school 
dropouts {Figure 8}.
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Figure 8: 
INCARCERATION RATES OF ASIAN MALE HIGH-SCHOOL DROPOUTS AGE 18-39 
BY NATIONAL ORIGIN & NATIVITY, 2000
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Source: 2000 Census, 5% PUMS.
*Although Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, not immigrants, for the purposes of this table those born on the island are classifi ed as “foreign-born” and those born on the 
mainland as “native-born.”
Figure 7: 
INCARCERATION RATES OF HISPANIC MALE HIGH-SCHOOL DROPOUTS AGE 18-39 
BY NATIONAL ORIGIN & NATIVITY, 2000
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Figure 9: 
INCARCERATION RATES OF FOREIGN-BORN MALES AGE 18-39 
BY PAN-ETHNIC GROUP & LENGTH OF U.S. RESIDENCE, 2000
THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION
The higher rate of imprisonment for native-born men than foreign-born men highlights a darker side to as-
similation than is commonly recognized. It traditionally has 
been assumed that assimilation involves the acquisition by 
immigrants and their descendants of English-language pro-
fi ciency, higher levels of education, valuable new job skills, 
and other attributes that ease their entry into U.S. society 
and improve their chances of success in the U.S. economy. 
However, other aspects of assimilation are not as positive. For 
instance, public-health experts have noted an “epidemiologi-
cal paradox” among immigrants, especially those from Latin 
America. On the one hand, they have lower rates of adult 
and infant mortality and give birth to fewer underweight 
babies than natives despite higher poverty rates and greater 
barriers to health care. But, on the other hand, their health 
status—and that of their children—worsens the longer they 
live in the United States. As they adopt an “American” diet 
high in fats, sugars, and processed foods, they experience 
sharp increases in obesity and in the incidence of diseases 
such as diabetes and high blood pressure.27
In addition, assimilation often entails incorporation into 
“minority” status in the United States, particularly among 
poor immigrants from non-European countries. As a result, 
the children and grandchildren of many immigrants—as well 
as many immigrants themselves the longer they live in the 
United States—become subject to economic and social forces 
that increase the likelihood of criminal behavior among other 
natives. This is especially true in impoverished communities 
where the native-born in particular are much more likely 
than immigrants (especially recent immigrants) to experience 
higher rates of divorce and drug and alcohol addiction.28
THE RISK OF INCARCERATION FOR 
IMMIGRANTS INCREASES OVER TIME
The 2000 Census shows that the risk of incarceration is higher not only for the children of immigrants, but 
for immigrants themselves the longer they have resided in 
the United States. Among foreign-born Hispanic men, the 
incarceration rate nearly tripled from 0.6 percent for those 
who had been in the United States 5 years or less to 1.7 per-
cent for those with 16 or more years of residence. Similarly, 
foreign-born non-Hispanic white men and black men who 
had been in the country for 16 or more years were more than 
twice as likely to be in prison as those who had been in the 
United States for 5 years or less {Figure 9}. However, even 
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Source: 2000 Census, 5% PUMS.
*Although Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens, not immigrants, for the purposes of this table those born on the island are classifi ed as “foreign-born” and those born on the 
mainland as “native-born.”
Figure 10: 
INCARCERATION RATES OF FOREIGN-BORN HISPANIC MALES AGE 18-39 
BY NATIONAL ORIGIN & LENGTH OF U.S. RESIDENCE
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immigrants who had resided in the United States for 16+ years 
were far less likely to be incarcerated than their native-born 
counterparts in each pan-ethnic category.
The increasing risk of incarceration among foreign-born 
men the longer they reside in the United States varied among 
the different nationalities within pan-ethnic categories. 
Among foreign-born men from Mexico, El Salvador, Gua-
temala, and Cuba, the chance of being in prison was more 
than twice as great for those in the country 16 years or more 
as for those with 5 years or less of residence. The incarcera-
tion rate for Colombians, Ecuadorians, and Peruvians in the 
country 5 years or less was more than 3 times lower than for 
those with 16 or more years of residence {Figure 10}. Among 
foreign-born Asian men, the risk of incarceration was 3 times 
greater for Chinese/Taiwanese and Indian men with 16+ 
years of residence than for those with 0-5 years, and 5 times 
greater for Koreans who had been in the country for 16 years 
or more {Figure 11}.
SIMILAR RESULTS FROM OTHER STUDIES
The evidence from the 2000 Census demonstrating the lower rate of incarceration among immigrants is rein-
forced by other studies conducted over the past century. For 
instance, a study by economists Kristin Butcher and Anne 
Morrison Piehl based on data from the 1980 and 1990 Cen-
suses yielded similar fi ndings.29 A more recent analysis by 
Butcher and Piehl demonstrates that these fi ndings are not the 
result of increased deportations of non-citizen criminals or the 
impact of harsher immigration laws in deterring immigrants 
from committing crimes. Rather, the authors conclude that 
during the 1990s, “those immigrants who chose to come to 
the United States were less likely to be involved in criminal 
activity than earlier immigrants and the native born.”30 Taken 
together, studies such as these provide consistent and compel-
ling evidence over a period of three decades that incarceration 
rates are much lower among immigrant men than the national 
norm despite their lower levels of education and higher rates 
13
0.0%
0.2%
0.4%
0.6%
0.8%
1.0%
1.2%
1.4%
Laot
ian/
Cam
bod
ian*
Viet
nam
ese
Filip
ino
Kore
an
Chin
ese/
Taiw
anes
e
Indi
an
0-5 yrs
6-15 yrs
16+ yrs
Source: 2000 Census, 5% PUMS.
*There were too few Laotian/Cambodian men who had been in the United States for 0-5 years as of 2000 to provide an accurate estimate.
Figure 11: 
INCARCERATION RATES OF FOREIGN-BORN ASIAN MALES AGE 18-39 
BY NATIONAL ORIGIN & LENGTH OF U.S. RESIDENCE, 2000
of poverty. In 2000, these patterns applied to every ethnic 
group without exception.
Other scholars, such as sociologist Robert J. Sampson, 
have addressed similar questions concerning immigration 
and crime and concluded that increased immigration is a 
major factor associated with lower crime rates. In a study of 
180 Chicago neighborhoods from 1995 to 2002, Sampson 
and his colleagues found that Latin American immigrants 
were less likely than the U.S.-born to commit violent crimes 
even when they lived in dense communities with high rates 
of poverty. First-generation immigrants (foreign-born) were 
45 percent less likely to commit violent crimes than were 
third-generation Americans (children of native-born par-
ents), adjusting for family and neighborhood background. 
The second generation (those born in the United States to 
immigrant parents) was 22 percent less likely to commit vio-
lent crimes than the third or higher generation.31 Similarly, 
the U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform concluded 
in a 1994 report that immigration is not associated with 
higher crime. The Commission compared crime rates in U.S.-
Mexico border cities such as El Paso with cities elsewhere in 
the United States and found that crime rates generally were 
lower in border cities.32
Recent empirical studies by sociologists Ramiro Martínez 
and Matthew Lee of homicides in three high-immigration 
border cities (San Diego, El Paso, and Miami) and of drug 
violence in Miami and San Diego came to similar conclusions, 
further refuting commonly presumed linkages between im-
migration and criminality.33 In addition, several other studies 
have examined homicide rates among the Cuban refugees who 
arrived in the United States as a result of the Mariel Boatlift 
of 1980. Although these marielitos frequently were depicted 
in the media as prolifi c criminal offenders, even murderers, 
they in fact were not overrepresented among either homicide 
victims or offenders. Moreover, after only a short time in the 
United States, they were much less likely to commit crimes 
than Cubans who arrived in Miami before the Mariel Boat-
lift. As with south Florida in general, Miami experienced a 
sharp spike in homicides before the Mariel Cubans arrived 
in the city. Homicide rates continued to decline throughout 
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the 1980s despite a steady infl ow of Latin American im-
migrants.34
Data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adoles-
cent Health (Add Health) further demonstrate the intra- and 
inter-generational differences in delinquency and other risk 
behaviors among adolescents. Add Health is a nationally 
representative longitudinal survey of adolescents conducted 
in several “waves” since 1994. Drawing upon this survey, 
sociologists Kathleen Mullan Harris, and Hoan Bui and 
Ornuma Thingniramol, have found that second-generation 
youth were signifi cantly more prone to engage in risk behav-
iors such as delinquency, violence, and substance abuse than 
foreign-born youth. In their analyses, every fi rst-generation 
nationality had signifi cantly fewer health problems and en-
gaged in fewer risk behaviors than the comparable group of 
native-born non-Hispanic whites.35
In a sense, these fi ndings should not come as news, 
for they are not new—merely forgotten and overruled by 
popular myth. In the fi rst three decades of the 20th century, 
during the previous era of mass immigration, three major 
government commissions came to similar conclusions. The 
Industrial Commission of 1901, the [Dillingham] Immigra-
tion Commission of 1911, and the [Wickersham] National 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement of 1931 
each sought to measure how immigration resulted in increases 
in crime. Instead, each found lower levels of criminal involve-
ment among the foreign-born and higher levels among their 
native-born counterparts.36 As the report of the Dillingham 
Commission concluded a century ago: “No satisfactory 
evidence has yet been produced to show that immigration 
has resulted in an increase in crime disproportionate to the 
increase in adult population. Such comparable statistics of 
crime and population as it has been possible to obtain in-
dicate that immigrants are less prone to commit crime than 
are native Americans.”37
CONCLUSION
Because many immigrants to the United States, especially Mexicans and Central Americans, are young men who 
arrive with very low levels of formal education, popular ste-
reotypes and standard criminological theory tend to associate 
them with higher rates of crime and incarceration. The fact 
that many of these immigrants enter the country through 
unauthorized channels or overstay their visas often is framed 
as an assault against the “rule of law,” thereby reinforcing the 
impression that immigration and criminality are linked. This 
association has fl ourished in a post-9/11 climate of fear and 
ignorance where terrorism and undocumented immigration 
often are mentioned in the same breath.
But anecdotal impression cannot substitute for scientifi c 
evidence. In fact, data from the census and other sources show 
that for every ethnic group, without exception, incarceration 
rates among young men are lowest for immigrants, even 
those who are the least educated and the least acculturated. 
This holds true especially for the Mexicans, Salvadorans, and 
Guatemalans who make up the bulk of the undocumented 
population. What is more, these patterns have been observed 
consistently over the last three decennial censuses, a period 
that spans the current era of mass immigration and mass 
imprisonment, and recall similar national-level fi ndings re-
ported by three major government commissions during the 
fi rst three decades of the 20th century.
Given the cumulative weight of this evidence, immi-
gration is arguably one of the reasons that crime rates have 
dropped in the United States over the past decade and a 
half. Indeed, a further implication of this evidence is that if 
immigrants suddenly disappeared and the country became 
immigrant-free (and illegal-immigrant free), crime rates 
would likely increase. The problem of crime and incarceration 
in the United States is not “caused” or even aggravated by 
immigrants, regardless of their legal status. But the mispercep-
tion that the opposite is true persists among policymakers, 
the media, and the general public, thereby undermining the 
development of reasoned public responses to both crime and 
immigration.
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